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CORRECTIONAL SERVICES CORPORATION V.
MALESKO: UNMASKING THE IMPLIED DAMAGE
REMEDY
I. INTRODUCTION
In Marbury v. Madison,, Justice Marshall held that, "the very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every indi-
vidual to claim the protection of the laws."' A century and a half
later, the right to claim protection of the law surfaced as the cen-
tral issue in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bu-
reau of Narcotics.3 In Bivens, the Supreme Court inferred a dam-
age remedy where an equally effective remedy did not otherwise
exist.4 The Court justified the inference by holding that "'federal
courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong
done.' 5
Since Bivens, the implied damage remedy has been criticized as
a transgression of judicial power.6 As a result, the use of the
Bivens inferred damage remedy has been subjected to judicial
limitation.7 The limitations placed on the Bivens remedy are es-
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. Id. at 163.
3. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
4. Id. at 410-11 (Harlan, J., concurring).
5. Id. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
6. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 34 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 249 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
7. See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994) (finding that the extension of
Bivens to include a damages remedy against federal agencies would mean the evisceration
of the Bivens remedy); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988) (indicating that the
Court has "responded cautiously to suggestions that Bivens remedies be extended into new
contexts"); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983) (finding that in the absence of legisla-
tion, the federal courts should look for special factors that counsel hesitation before au-
thorizing a new kind of federal remedy); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983)
(concluding that the need for decisive military action would be undermined by a Bivens
remedy that exposed military personnel to liability).
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pecially apparent in the recent decision of Correctional Services
Corp. v. Malesko.8
This note examines the Malesko decision and its effect on
Bivens. Part II reviews the history of the Bivens cause of action.
Part III examines the majority opinion, concurrence, and dissent
of Malesko. Part IV analyzes the underlying rationale behind
Malesko and Malesko's effect on Bivens. Finally, Part V discusses
the future of a Bivens cause of action.
II. IMPLYING A DAMAGE REMEDY: THE BIVENS METAMORPHOSIS
A. The Arrival of Bivens
In Bell v. Hood,9 the plaintiff alleged that officers of the FBI
violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights when they ille-
gally arrested him, falsely imprisoned him, and illegally searched
and seized his property.10 The plaintiff sought relief solely on the
grounds of the officers' alleged constitutional violations.,, The Su-
preme Court recognized that the legality of the plaintiffs request
for relief based solely on constitutional claims "ha[d] never been
specifically decided by [the] Court.",2 The Court left the legality of
the request unanswered." The question remained unanswered
until the Bivens Court affirmed the validity of relief based en-
tirely on the grounds of a federal officer's constitutional viola-
tions."4
In Bivens, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, acting
under their federal authority, entered into Bivens's apartment
8. 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
9. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
10. Id. at 679-80.
11. Id. at 681 ("[Ilt is clear from the way [the complaint] was drawn that petitioners
seek recovery squarely on the ground that respondents violated the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.").
12. Id. at 684.
13. See id. at 684-85.
14. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
397 (1971) ("Having concluded that petitioner's complaint states a cause of action under
the Fourth Amendment, we hold that petitioner is entitled to recover money damages for
any injuries he has suffered as a result of the agents' violation of the Amendment." (cita-
tion omitted)).
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without a warrant or probable cause.'5 The agents "searched the
apartment from stem to stern," arrested Bivens, and threatened
his family.,6 Bivens sought damages under the Fourth Amend-
ment 17 for having "suffered great humiliation, embarrassment,
and mental suffering.",8 The Supreme Court relied on Bell's lan-
guage that "'federal courts may use any available remedy to make
good the wrong done,'" in order to imply a damage remedy in fa-
vor of Bivens. 9
Justice Brennan, author of the Bivens opinion, indicated that
the courts should not imply a remedy in two instances.20 First, he
noted that courts should not apply a Bivens remedy if there are
"special factors counselling hesitation."2' Second, the courts
should not invoke a Bivens remedy when there is an "explicit con-
gressional declaration.., equally effective in the view of Con-
gress."22 Justice Brennan concluded that Bivens was not restricted
by either of these limitations.2 Therefore, Justice Brennan al-
lowed the inferred damage remedy.24
Justice Harlan concurred with the majority opinion that fed-
eral courts have the power to infer damages directly from the
Constitution.25 However, he delineated a different method to de-
termine when courts should use this power. 26 Justice Harlan be-
lieved that courts should only infer a damage remedy when it is
necessary to vindicate the plaintiffs constitutional interests.27 He
15. Id. at 389.
16. Id.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated.").
18. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389-90.
19. Id. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). According to Justice
Brennan, an implied remedy was necessary because there was no congressional authoriza-
tion allowing for a damage remedy based on a constitutional violation, nor was there a
damage award explicit in the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 397.
20. See id. at 396-97.
21. Id. at 396. An example of a special factor counseling hesitation would be Con-
gress's expertise in situations involving the military. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462
U.S. 296, 304 (1983).
22. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
23. Id. at 396-97.
24. Id. at 397.
25. Id. at 398-99 (Harlan, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 409-10 (Harlan, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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concluded that for Bivens "it [was] damages or nothing."2 There-
fore, Justice Harlan, like Justice Brennan, allowed the inferred
damage remedy.29
B. The Evolution of Bivens
1. The "Equally Effective" 30 Approach: A Short-Lived Extension
In the years following Bivens, the Court extended the damage
remedy beyond Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.1 First, in
Davis v. Passman,32 an implied damage remedy was granted to a
deputy administrative assistant whose Fifth Amendment rights
were violated by the Congressman who employed her.33 After
Davis, Justice Brennan created a two-prong test in Carlson v.
Green34 based on principles that the Court formulated in Bivens.3 5
Specifically, the test provided that a Bivens action was permissi-
ble unless: (1) special factors counseled hesitation; or (2) Congress
had explicitly provided an alternative remedy viewed as "equally
effective ."36 The Court allowed Carlson, a federal prisoner, to re-
cover damages from a federal officer under the Eighth Amend-
ment using the two-prong test.3 7
The Carlson decision illustrated a narrow application of the
equally effective prong of Justice Brennan's test. In Carlson, the
implied damage remedy was upheld despite the availability of an
alternative remedy through the Federal Tort Claims Act
28. Id. at 409-10 (Harlan, J., concurring). According to Justice Harlan, other forms of
remediation, such as injunctive relief, would be inconsequential to Bivens because Bivens
did not face a realistic threat of future harm from federal agent misconduct. Id. (Harlan,
J., concurring).
29. Id. at 411 (Harlan, J., concurring).
30. Carlson v.- Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980). The "equally effective" label is de-
rived from the two-prong test articulated in Carlson. Id.
31. See, e.g., id. at 18-20; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 244 (1979).
32. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
33. Id. at 230-31, 244.
34. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
35. Id. at 18-19.
36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 20. Carlson was able to recover under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment because federal officials did not give him adequate
medical care. Id. at 16.
38. See id. at 19-23.
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(FTCA)39 The Court held that the FTCA was not viewed as an
equally effective alternative remedy.4° The Court reasoned that
the FTCA remedy did not replace a Bivens remedy because it was
made "crystal clear" by Congress that the FTCA and Bivens were
to serve as complimentary, not alternative, causes of action. 41 The
broad reading of the second prong of Brennan's test made the dis-
covery of an equally effective remedy difficult and led to more
successful Bivens actions than are found today.42
2. Criticism of Bivens and Its Progeny
From its inception, Bivens was wrought with controversy. 43 One
prevalent criticism, authored by Chief Justice Burger, was that a
judicially created damage remedy "not provided for by the Consti-
tution and not enacted by Congress" violated the separation of
powers doctrine. 44 The separation of powers doctrine was derived
from the idea that the legislative and executive branches of gov-
ernment should be separate entities and that this division would
subsequently impart a balanced government.45 A necessary aspect
39. Id. The FTCA creates a cause of action against the United States for intentional
acts committed by federal officers in lieu of sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680
(2000).
40. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19-23. The Court explained that there was no congressional
declaration that a person may not recover money damages for violations of the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 19. The Court also indicated that the Bivens remedy is superior to the
FTCA remedy because it acts as a deterrent, allows for punitive damages, allows a plain-
tiff to opt for a jury, and permits a plaintiff to bring an action without state approval. Id.
at 19-23.
41. Id. at 19-20.
42. The Court permitted Bivens actions in Carlson and Davis because the Court
viewed the statutory remedies as unable to provide relief as effective as damages. Id. at
19; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 247 (1979). Arguing that the majority's opinion in
Carlson was unnecessarily broad, Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, stated that
"today's opinion apparently will permit Bivens plaintiffs to ignore entirely adequate reme-
dies if Congress has not clothed them in the prescribed linguistic garb." Carlson, 446 U.S.
at 27 (Powell, J., concurring). For a discussion on federal court decisions following Carlson,
see David C. Nutter,'Note, Two Approaches to Determine Whether an Implied Cause of Ac-
tion Under the Constitution is Necessary: The Changing Scope of the Bivens Action, 19 GA.
L. REV. 683, 708-13 (1985).
43. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 428 (Black, J., dissenting) (asserting that
Bivens would "choke" the courts with lawsuits and prognosticating that a Bivens remedy
would open the door for frivolous suits that would inevitably delay an already slow path of
justice).
44. Id. at 411 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
45. DAAN BRAVEMAN, WILLIAM C. BANKS & RODNEY A. SMOLLA, CONSTITUTIONAL
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of the separation of powers model was the checks and balances it
placed on the branches of government.46 The intended balance in
the American governmental system is illustrated through the
Constitution's grant of power to each of the three branches.
"IlThe Constitution assigned primary responsibility for lawmak-
ing to the legislature, for law enforcing to the executive, and for
law deciding to the courts."4 Along with the grant of power, the
framers "built into the tripartite Federal Government ... a self-
executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandize-
ment of one branch at the expense of the other."
49
Chief Justice Burger continued to criticize the Court's en-
croachment on Congress's power in the majority's pro-Bivens de-
cisions of Davis and Carlson.59 In Davis, Chief Justice Burger
admitted that Congress can "make Bivens-type remedies avail-
able... but it has not done so."5' As such, the Court transgressed
the boundaries of the separation of powers doctrine when it pro-
vided remedies that Congress had not legislated. 2 Additionally,
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Carlson highlighted the separation
of powers controversy when he called the creation of Bivens-type
remedies "a task that is more appropriately viewed as falling
within the legislative sphere of authority." 5
LAW: STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS IN OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM § 2.01 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] (noting that separation of powers stemmed from the philosophies of
John Locke and Montesquieu).
46. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957-958 (1983) ("To preserve those checks, and
maintain the separation of powers, the carefully defined limits on the power of each
Branch must not be eroded."); see also CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 45, § 2.01.
47. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) ("Once Congress, exercis-
ing its delegated powers, has decided the order of priorities in a given area, it is for the
Executive to administer the laws and for the courts to enforce them when enforcement is
sought."); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803).
48. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 45, § 2.03[B].
49. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam).
50. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 30-31 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Davis
v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 249 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
51. Davis, 442 U.S. at 249 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 250 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[U]ntil Congress legislates otherwise as to
employment standards for its own staffs, judicial power in this area is circumscribed. The
Court today encroaches on that barrier.").
53. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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3. A Response to the Critics
Following Carlson, the Court has been cautious in its extension
of the Bivens doctrine.54 This reluctance is noted in the Court's
analytical transformation of Justice Brennan's Bivens doctrine.
5
Central to this change was Justice Harlan's concurrence in
Bivens, in which he allowed a Bivens remedy only if no alterna-
tive forms of compensation existed for the constitutional wrong
done. 6 Justice Harlan's approach is distinguishable from Justice
Brennan's because a remedy that is not equally effective still may
be upheld as long as it supplies some meaningful redress. 57 In
Bush v. Lucas,8 the Court acknowledged that the "civil service
remedies were not as effective as an individual damages remedy
and did not fully compensate [the petitioner] for the harm he suf-
fered."5 Despite this acknowledgement, the Court subsequently
dismissed the plaintiffs Bivens claim, indicating an abandonment
of Justice Brennan's "equally effective" approach and an accep-
tance of Justice Harlan's "damages or nothing" approach.
6 0
Equally as important as Justice Harlan's concurrence in Bivens
was the emphasis placed on the special factors prong of the im-
plied remedy test.6 1 The special factors prong became the primary
tool to dismiss a Bivens action following Carlson.12 The Court
54. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988); see also cases cited supra note 7.
55. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388-90 (1983); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S.
296, 298-300 (1983); see also Nutter, supra note 42, at 694 (noting that after Davis and
Carlson the Court abandoned the "equally effective" approach and adopted the "damages
or nothing" approach).
56. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or noth-
ing.").
57. See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 429 ("Congress, however, has addressed the problems
created by state agencies' wrongful termination of disability benefits."); see also Bush, 462
U.S. at 390 ("Congress is in a better position to decide whether or not the public interest
would be served by creating [a new substantive legal liability].").
58. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
59. Id. at 372 (footnotes omitted).
60. See id. at 388-90. Just as the FTCA remedy was found lacking in Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-23 (1980), the proposed remedies in Bush and Schweiker would
likely have been found lacking if the equally effective approach remained the dominant
approach. See Nutter, supra note 42, at 698-701. For further discussion on the acceptance
of the "damages or nothing" approach in lieu of the "equally effective" approach, see id. at
701-08.
61. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 380; Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298 (1983).
62. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304 ("Taken together, the unique disciplinary structure of
the Military Establishment and Congress' activity in the field constitute 'special factors'
2003]
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used this analysis to show that a congressionally supplied remedy
(even if less effective than damages) was a special factor that
counseled hesitation.68
For example, in Schweiker v. Chilicky,64 Congress created an
elaborate remedial scheme that did not include money damages.
5
The Court refused to apply a Bivens remedy despite the lack of
monetary damages under Congress's regime.66 The Court rea-
soned that where a government program suggests that Congress
has provided what it considers a sufficient remedy, a Bivens ac-
tion must be dismissed.6 7 Additionally, the Court has held since
Carlson that the legislature is far more competent than the judi-
ciary in making decisions involving congressional expertise. 8
When cases of this nature arise, the courts are to view this as a
reason to "'counsel[ ] hesitation"'6 9 and dismiss a Bivens claim.70
The Court cited Congress's expertise in the military and adminis-
trative fields in dismissing Bivens actions in Chappell v. Wallace71
and Bush .7
In subsequent Bivens cases, the Court continued to respond
"cautiously to suggestions that Bivens remedies be extended into
new contexts." 7 For example, in the unanimously decided FDIC v.
Meyer,7 4 the Court did not support the extension of Bivens liability
to federal agencies.7 5 In Meyer, an employee brought an action
against the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
which dictate that it would be inappropriate to provide enlisted military personnel a Bi-
vens-type remedy .... ").
63. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 372 (allowing the congressional remedy despite the fact that
the remedy "did not fully compensate [the plaintiffl for the harm he suffered"); see also
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988) ("Here, exactly as in Bush, Congress has
failed to provide for 'complete relief ... .
64. 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
65. Id. at 426.
66. Id. at 426-27.
67. Id. at 421-23.
68. See, e.g., Bush, 462 U.S. at 390; Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304.
69. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 298 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)).
70. Id. at 304.
71. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
72. See id. at 303-04 (neglecting to mention the alternative remedy prong); see also
Bush, 462 U.S. at 388-90.
73. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 421.
74. 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
75. Id. at 486.
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("FSLIC") alleging that his termination violated his Fifth
Amendment right to procedural due process.76 The Supreme
Court found that FSLIC could not be found liable under a Bivens
cause of action.7 7 They reasoned that if an agency was open to
Bivens liability, then Bivens plaintiffs would sue federal agencies
.instead of federal officers in an effort to avoid the officer's quali-
fied immunity defense.7 8 •The Court emphasized that "the purpose
of Bivens [was] to deter the officer," not the agency, from uncon-
stitutional conduct. 79 Therefore, the Court found that affording
Bivens liability to federal agencies would eviscerate the deterrent
purpose of Bivens. 0 The Court's willingness to extend Bivens was
tested soon after the restrictions set by Meyer in Correctional
Services Corp. v. Malesko.81
III. CORRECTIONAL SERVICES CORP. V. MALESKO: THE DEATH
KNELL FOR BIVENS?
In 1992, John E. Malesko was convicted of federal securities
fraud.82 While imprisoned, Malesko was diagnosed with a heart
condition and prescribed medication.13 He was subsequently
transferred to a halfway house in February 1994.84 The house was
operated by Correctional Services Corporation ("CSC") on behalf
of the Federal Bureau of Prisoners ("BOP").8 5 CSC instituted a
policy that prevented anyone living below the sixth floor of the
house from using the elevator for travel to and from the lobby.8
Malesko lived on the fifth floor, which would ordinarily prevent
him from using the elevator.87 However, he was exempt from the
policy because of his heart condition.8 After attempting to use the
76. Id. at 473-74. FSLIC's statutory successor, Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, took over the litigation on behalf of FSLIC. Id. at 474.
77. Id. at 486.
78. Id. at 485.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
82. Id. at 64.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 63-64.
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elevator, Jorge Urena, a CSC employee, told Malesko to use the
stairs. 9 Despite Malesko's protest, Urena insisted.90 On his as-
cent, Malesko suffered a heart attack and injured himself from
the subsequent fall.91
Approximately three years after the incident, Malesko filed a
pro se action against CSC and ten unknown defendants for viola-
tions of his constitutional rights. 2 Two years later, with the assis-
tance of counsel, Malesko amended his complaint.98 In the
amended complaint, he substituted Jorge Urena as the first un-
known defendant. 94 Malesko's final complaint alleged that CSC,
Urena, and unnamed defendants were negligent in his treat-
ment.99
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York treated Malesko's suit as a Bivens claim.9 It held that
private corporations like CSC were not amenable to Bivens ac-
tions, based on Meyer's finding that Bivens claims could only be
maintained against individuals.97 Therefore, it dismissed the ac-
tion.9 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed in part, holding that CSC "should be held liable under
Bivens to 'accomplish the... important Bivens goal of providing a
remedy for constitutional violations.' ' 99 The Supreme Court







95. Id. at 64-65.
96. Id. at 65.
97. Id.
98. Id. In addition, Malesko's Bivens action against Urena was dismissed because the
statute of limitations had expired. Id.
99. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Malesko v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 229 F.3d 374,
380 (2d Cir. 2000)).
100. Id. at 66.
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A. Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist began the majority opinion with a de-
tailed history of the Bivens claim,101 emphasizing the Court's cau-
tion in its extension of Bivens.0 2 Rehnquist then gave two pri-
mary motives for dismissing the Bivens action against CSC.0 3
First, corporate liability in a Bivens action would eviscerate its
deterrent effect on individual unconstitutional conduct.', Second,
Malesko had alternative available remedies available to him. 10 5
1. The Deterrent Effect
The Court has made it clear since its emphasis in Meyer that a
primary function of Bivens is to deter individual federal officers
from committing constitutional violations.106 In the deterrence
discussion, Chief Justice Rehnquist equated the private corpora-
tion (CSC) with the federal agency (FSLIC)."°7 The Court theo-
rized that the higher success rates of Bivens suits against corpo-
rations would inevitably lead to Bivens plaintiffs bringing actions
with greater frequency against corporations rather than indi-
viduals. 1s Therefore, as in Meyer,1°9 the Court stated that allow-
ing employer liability, as opposed to employee liability, would re-
duce suits against individuals.110 In turn, this would reduce the
deterrent impact on the individual." While the Court recognized
that corporate liability may have a deterrent effect, it insisted
101. Id. at 67-70.
102. Id. at 68 ("Since Carlson we have consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to
any new context or new category of defendants.").
103. Id. at 71-74.
104. Id. at 71.
105. Id. at 72-74. The alternative remedies included relief through the BOP and a
state tort remedy. Id.
106. Id. at 70-71.
107. Id. at 71 (stating that "[tihis case is, in every meaningful sense, the same [as
Meyer]").
108. Id. at 70-71.
109. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1993); see also supra notes 74-81 and accompa-
nying text.
110. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71 (stating that if corporate defendants are open to suit, then
plaintiffs will try to collect damages from the corporations, not from the individual respon-
sible for the harm).
111. Id.
20031
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that this form of liability was not contemplated in Bivens."'
Therefore, corporate liability should not apply without congres-
sional approval.,,
2. Alternative Remedies
In Carlson, Justice Brennan formulated the two-prong test
which mandated "equally effective" alternative remedies.1 4 Since
Carlson, the test has changed to the less stringent "effective rem-
edy" analysis. 115 This change is especially evident in Malesko.
The Malesko opinion presented a narrower version of the sec-
ond prong, thus negating Justice Brennan's original creation in
Carlson.16 Malesko established that a Bivens action is dismissed
if the claimant has "any alternative remedy,"" 7 not the "equally ef-
fective remedy" that Justice Brennan posed.' 8 Chief Justice
Rehnquist stipulated, as Justice Harlan did in his Bivens concur-
rence, 1 9 that the Bivens remedy will not apply unless the Court is
confronted with a "damages or nothing" situation.20 The Court in-
terpreted an "effective remedy" narrowly and determined that
Malesko had two effective alternative remedies.', The first was a
state tort action against CSC.12 The Court determined that Male-
sko had the opportunity to bring a state negligence action against
CSC for its failure to obtain medication and for its refusal of
112. Id.
113. Id. at 72 ("Whether it makes sense to impose asymmetrical liability costs on pri-
vate prison facilities alone is a question for Congress, not us, to decide."); see also Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 249 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (admitting that Congress can
"make Bivens-type remedies available... but it has not done so").
114. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980).
115. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 386-88 (1983). The Court stated that "the Govern-
ment's comprehensive scheme ... provides meaningful remedies." Id. at 386.
116. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72-74 (noting that because Malesko had alternative
remedies at his disposal, though maybe not equally effective, there was no need for a Bi-
vens remedy).
117. Id. at 70.
118. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19.
119. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
120. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72 ("Nor are we confronted with a situation in which claim-
ants in respondent's shoes lack effective remedies.")
121. Id. at 72-74.
122. Id. at 73.
[Vol. 37:639
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Malesko's elevator privileges. 123 Additionally, Malesko could have
sought relief through the BOP's remedial mechanisms. 124 This
would provide Malesko with injunctive relief and the means to
have CSC's unconstitutional actions brought to the attention of
the BOP.12
5
In short, the Court did not characterize Malesko as a "damages
or nothing" plaintiff.126 He had the strategic choice of bringing ei-
ther a state tort action or an action through the BOP's remedial
mechanisms. 127 Therefore, the Court was unwilling to sacrifice the
individual deterrent effect of Bivens in order to extend a doctrine
that had not been extended in three decades.
28
B. Concurrence
In the brief concurrence, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Tho-
mas, emphasized an inclination (which has also been the Court's
inclination since Carlson) to continue to construe Bivens nar-
rowly.129 Justice Scalia stated that even under a narrow interpre-
tation he would not extend Bivens to new constitutional con-
texts. 130 He cited the fact that Congress did not have a chance to
review the Bivens decision as a primary reason to limit its appli-
cation. 3 ' Justice Scalia also indicated that Bivens was an implied
constitutional remedy. 2 He characterized the doctrine of implied
constitutional remedies as a "relic" that has been abandoned.
33
123. Id. at 73. The district court originally construed Malesko's complaint as raising an
Eighth Amendment claim, and Malesko accepted this theory of liability in lieu of alterna-
tive claims. Id. Thus, unlike the plaintiff in Bivens, Malesko had a state tort law remedy
at his disposal. Id.
124. Id. at 74.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 72.
127. Id. at 72-74.
128. See id. at 68 ("Since Carlson we have consistently refused to extend Bivens liabil-
ity to any new context or new category of defendants.").
129. Id. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("1 join the opinion of the Court because I agree
that a narrow interpretation of the rationale of [Bivens] would not logically produce its ap-
plication to the circumstances of this case.").
130. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
131. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
132. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
133. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287
(2001) (indicating that the practice of implying remedies has been abandoned).
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Based on these comments, it is apparent that the concurrence has
a distaste for Bivens and for judicial legislation.13
C. Dissent
Justice Stevens began the dissent by characterizing Malesko's
claim as an exception rather than an extension of Bivens.135 Jus-
tice Stevens cited appellate decisions where corporations acting
under federal title were viewed as individual human agents.136 He
maintained that because these courts do not perceive allowing a
Bivens action against a private corporation as an extension, then
neither should the Supreme Court.17
Justice Stevens challenged the majority's rationale by first not-
ing that Meyer is not dispositive precedent for the outcome
reached in Malesko.138 He attempted to distinguish Meyer from
Malesko by revealing that Meyer contained no discussion of corpo-
rations or corporate agents. 39 Rather, Meyer dealt entirely with a
federal agency. 40 The dissent further distinguished Meyer by not-
ing that Meyer did not deal with a well-recognized Bivens cause of
action.'1' In contrast, the cause of action in Malesko "falls in the
heartland of substantive Bivens claims." 42
Furthermore, Justice Stevens attempted to dismantle the ma-
jority's rationale that Malesko had effective alternative remedies
and that Bivens liability on private corporations would not have
the deterrent value that Bivens envisioned.14 First, he focused on
134. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75. (Scalia, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 76-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined by Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
136. See id. at 77 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 76-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (indicating that it was evident from the ap-
pellate decisions that corporations were treated as an exception to the Bivens action).
138. Id. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Meyer... does not lead to the outcome reached
by the Court [in Malesko].").
139. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994)
(discussing the financial burden that suing a federal agency would have on the federal
government).
141. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 78 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Meyer dealt with a Fifth
Amendment claim, which has been treated differently in past Bivens actions. Meyer, 510
U.S. at 489 & n.9.
142. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 78-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the majority's "any alternative remedy" rationale. M The dissent
pointed out that the plaintiff in Bivens could have theoretically
brought a suit against the defendant officer under state tort
law. 145 Additionally, in both Carlson and Bivens, plaintiffs had
available FTCA remedies. 146 Thus, the dissent argued that if
Malesko's claim was dismissed because of alternative remedies,
then claims against individual defendants in cases like Carlson
and Bivens also should have been dismissed.
4 7
Justice Stevens went on to attack the majority's reliance on the
state tort remedy.148 He conceded that a Bivens plaintiff might
find state tort relief in constitutional claims which traditionally
implicate negligence, such as an Eighth Amendment cruel and
unusual punishment claim.' 49 Justice Stevens emphasized, how-
ever, that there were other constitutional claims which were less
likely to be associated with a traditional tort remedy.150 Thus, the
lack of state tort remedies for all constitutional claims would
jeopardize the protection of constitutional rights and would make
state tort claims an ineffective alternative remedy.""
The second basis for the majority's holding was that corporate
liability would not satisfy Bivens's deterrent purpose. 152 The dis-
sent perceived Bivens liability on corporate employers to have a
deterrent effect equal to liability on the employees.'5 The dissent
cited Richardson v. McKnight 4 and its finding that 'private
firms adjust their behavior in response to the incentives that tort
suits provide"' as evidence of effective corporate deterrence.'55
144. Id. at 78-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 78-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the claim in Carlson was not dismissed).
148. Id. at 79-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting) "It is ironic that the Court relies so heavily
for its holding on this assumption that alternative effective remedies... are available to
respondent." Id. at 79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (attempting to show the remedy's ineffectiveness by
illustrating that the uniformity of federal law will be undermined if the courts depend on
state tort remedies to alleviate constitutional wrongs).
151. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 70-71.
153. Id. at 80-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It cannot be seriously maintained, however,
that tort remedies against corporate employers have less deterrent value than actions
against their employees.").
154. 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
155. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 81 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Richardson, 521 U.S. at
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Further, the dissent viewed the lack of liability imposed on CSC
as a danger to the constitutional rights of thousands of CSC in-
mates. 6 Justice Stevens theorized that corporations will continue
to sacrifice the rights of prisoners as a cost-cutting measure be-
cause of the lack of tort liability pressure on private corpora-
tions.117
Finally, the dissent questioned the integrity of the majority's
opinion. 5  Justice Stevens cited the critical discussion of Bivens
as evidence that "the driving force behind the Court's decision [in
Malesko] is a disagreement with the holding in Bivens itself.",-9
The dissent described Bivens as "a well-recognized part of our
law" that should be applied and enforced as settled law.16
IV. THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND MALESKO AND ITS EFFECT ON
BIVENS
A. Is Bivens Dead?
The history of Chief Justice Rehnquist's language concerning
the strength of Bivens 61 gives validity to Justice Stevens's state-
ment that the Court's disagreement with the Bivens holding is
the "driving force" in the Malesko decision. 62 In Justice
Rehnquist's Carlson dissent, he stated, "to dispose of this case as
if Bivens were rightly decided would ... be to start with an 'unre-
ality.'' ' 3 Malesko, however, does not represent the death of
Bivens. On the contrary, Chief Justice Rehnquist confirmed that
Bivens and its progeny are still good law if they are construed
narrowly.16 Nevertheless, it would be accurate to say that Justice
Brennan's version of Bivens is dead.165
412).
156. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 81 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. See id. at 82-83. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 83 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("For our primary duty is to apply and enforce
settled law, not to revise that law to accord with our own notions of sound policy.").
161. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 32 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
162. See id. at 82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 89,(1949)).
164. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71. Rehnquist suggests in Malesko that the core premise
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The absence of Justice Brennan's two-prong doctrine in Male-
sko is evidence of its absolution.166 Malesko established that a
Bivens action is dismissed if the claimant has any effective reme-
dies, rather than the equally effective remedy that Justice Bren-
nan posed.167 This metamorphosis into a narrower version of
Bivens was years in the making. 68 Since Schweiker and Bush, the
Court has been willing to accept remedies that are not as equally
effective as Bivens's implied remedy.169 The acceptance of inferior
remedies shows the Court's deference to the legislature and em-
phasis on respect for separation of powers.' 70 Critics have said
that inferior remedies do not protect "the right of every individual
to claim the protection of the laws."'7' While it is true that the
Rehnquist Court's narrower application of Bivens may limit the
recovery of constitutional victims, it serves what the Court views
as the greater purpose 'of striking a wise balance between liberty
and order.' '172
B. Does Malesko Really Provide a Remedy?
Chief Justice Rehnquist based the majority opinion on the ra-
tionale that Malesko had alternative remedies at his disposal.1
73
of Bivens is still good law, but the Court will find anything beyond the core premise unac-
ceptable. Id.
165. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19.
166. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 66-74 (providing background on Bivens and cases follow-
ing without mention of Justice Brennan's two-prong test). Chief Justice Rehnquist's Male-
sko decision does not mention "special factors" (excluding the historical summary). Id. It
does focus on alternative remedies, but not the "equally effective remedies" that were first
contemplated by Justice Brennan. Id. at 72-73.
167. Id. at 72-74.
168. Chief Justice Rehnquist provided a summary of Bivens and the later decisions
that illustrated the "narrowing" of Bivens. See id. at 66-71.
169. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988) ("Here, exactly as in Bush, Con-
gress has failed to provide for 'complete relief . . ."); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388
(1983) ("[Elxisting remedies [by Congress] do not provide complete relief for the plain-
tiff.").
170. See, e.g., Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 424-27; Bush, 462 U.S. at 390; see also Nutter,
supra note 42, at 705 ("The Court in [Bush and Chappell] placed relatively greater weight
on separation of powers concerns and less on redressing constitutional wrongs.").
171. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); see also Bush, 462 U.S. at
372.
172. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 32 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
173. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72-74. "It was conceded at oral argument that alternative
remedies are at least as great, and in many respects greater, than anything that could be
had under Bivens." Id. at 72.
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But do these remedies always provide compensation? Both the
state tort remedy and injunctive relief that Chief Justice
Rehnquist suggested in Malesko were found to be lacking in
Bivens.74 The majority in Bivens characterized Chief Justice
Rehnquist's state tort suggestion as "inconsistent or even hostile"
to an individual's constitutionally protected rights.7 5 Addition-
ally, Justice Harlan's concurrence in Bivens illustrated the inef-
fectiveness of injunctive relief when he stated that "[ilt will be a
rare case indeed in which an individual in Bivens' position will be
able to obviate the harm by securing injunctive relief from any
court."176 Justice Harlan's concurrence rings true for Malesko. It is
unlikely that Malesko was concerned about future misconduct
from prison officials. Instead, he wanted to receive compensation
for past harms.
Ultimately, the Court recognized that the alternative remedies
available would not compensate Malesko fully for the harm he
suffered. 7  However, the Court reasoned that Malesko would
have had redress if he had "timely pursue [d]" the remedy that the
Court had sanctioned in Meyer. 78 The Court held that Malesko's
limited remedy was due to his "strategic choice."" 9 The Court fur-
ther noted that other claimants in Malesko's position had reme-
dies "at least as great" as those available under Bivens. 89 Thus,
the Court declined to extend Bivens by creating a judge-made
remedy.1'
C. A Look Behind the Mask of Malesko
Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Bivens, illustrated a point
central to the Bivens debate when he suggested that a judicially
174. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 393-94, 410 (1971).
175. Id. at 394; see also Malesko, 534 U.S. at 80 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[B]ut other
unconstitutional actions by prison employees, such as violations of the Equal Protection or
Due Process Clauses, may find no parallel causes of action in state tort law.").
176. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
177. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72-74.
178. Id. at 72.
179. Id. at 74.
180. Id. at 72.
181. Id. at 72-74. In declining to extend Bivens, the Court returned to its reasoning in
Bush that remedies created by Congress "foreclosed the need to fashion a new, judicially
crafted cause of action." Id. at 68.
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created damage remedy violates the separation of powers doc-
trine.182 Judicial legislation has historically been a topic of intense
scrutiny, one for which Chief Justice Rehnquist has had a par-
ticular aversion. 183 Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted deterrent ef-
fects and alternative remedies as the rationales behind the Male-
sko opinion. 1 4 However, when analyzing Malesko, it is impossible
to ignore Chief Justice Rehnquist's past distaste for Bivens.1 5 He
likely saw Malesko as an opportunity to emphasize his opinion
that Bivens is "'an exercise of power that the Constitution does
not give us. 1 86 Malesko gave Chief Justice Rehnquist the major-
ity of Justices needed to put the "'restraint[ I upon this Court's
depart[ing] from the field of interpretation to enter that of law-
making," 181 which was lost when Bivens was decided.
D. The Role of Stare Decisis in Malesko
Justice Stevens criticized the Court's holding in Malesko for not
giving full respect to a decision that had been recognized for over
thirty years. 18 He accused the Court of revising the law in accor-
dance with its own notions of policy rather than applying stare
decisis. 185 The criticism is ironic when one considers that Bivens
was created through a lack of respect for the well-recognized
separation of powers doctrine. 9° The Malesko decision establishes
182. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that Bivens impinges
on Congress's function to make the law).
183. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 34 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that this is a "task that is more appropriately viewed as falling within the legislative
sphere of authority."); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171-77 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (finding that the majority's decision was a violation of the separation of powers doc-
trine and the three trimester rule amounted to judicial legislation); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 74-75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (indicating that the Court was basing
their decision on their views of economic policy, rather than the substance of the Constitu-
tion).
184. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70-74.
185. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
186. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 428 (Black, J., dissent-
ing)).
187. Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 108 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(second alteration in original) (quoting James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 266 (Black,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
188. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 82-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Davis v. Pasman, 442
U.S. 228, 249-50 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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the Court's distaste for the ancient implied remedy regime by re-
turning to the status quo prior to the "heady days" of Bivens.191
The Malesko Court's departure from Bivens is justified for two
reasons. First, as Justice Scalia pointed out, "stare decisis has
less force where intervening decisions 'have removed or weakened
the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision.' ''192 In
Bivens, the Court intervened and weakened the conceptual un-
derpinning of the separation of powers doctrine. 93 Therefore, the
Malesko majority is effectively returning the Court to the order it
enjoyed before the implied remedies of Bivens. Additionally, a re-
cently invented law cannot be. afforded the full power of stare de-
cisis. 94 Justice Stevens provided as support for stare decisis that
Bivens has been recognized for over thirty years.'95 However,
thirty years is trivial compared to the two centuries that the
separation of powers doctrine has existed.'96
The contention that the judicial activism which created Bivens
should be extended based on stare decisis is paradoxical. Since
Bivens, Chief Justice Rehnquist and other members have criti-
cized the Court for practicing judicial legislation through the im-
plied Bivens remedy.197 These Justices have recognized that pro-
Bivens cases "simply ignore[] the constitutional doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers.' 198 To allow stare decisis to continue to extend a
Bivens decision that the Malesko majority perceives as an over-
stepping of judicial powers would "be to start with an 'unreal-
ity.,,199
191. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
192. Harper, 509 U.S. at 104 (Scalia, J. concurring) (quoting Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)).
193. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger believed that Bivens weak-
ened the separation of powers doctrine by "judicially creat[ing] a damage remedy not pro-
vided for by the Constitution and not enacted by Congress." Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
194. See Harper, 509 U.S. at 106 (Scalia, J., concurring).
195. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that
"[t]he doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787").
197. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 34 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 249-51 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
198. Davis, 442 U.S. at 255 (Powell, J., dissenting).
199. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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In short, the Malesko Court pays tribute to stare decisis by al-
lowing a very narrowly construed acceptance of Bivens, Davis,
and Carlson.20 The majority, however, does not want history to
repeat itself.2"' Thus, the majority does not extend Malesko,
thereby protecting the statutory field from judicial invention. 202
E. Malesko and the Government Contractor
Tasks that have historically been federal government under-
takings are being administered by government contractors with
increased regularity.0 3 The increased privatization of traditional
governmental functions is attributable to the efficiency and bene-
ficial competition that a government contractor provides. 211 Male-
sko presents an illustration of the type of privatization that is be-
coming commonplace and the complications that arise from a
private entity's assumption of a federal function.20'
In Malesko, the Court found that private entities like CSC were
not amenable to a Bivens cause of action.20 6 The Court's reluctance
to extend Bivens liability to corporations favors the government
contractor. In effect, it makes the government contractor immune
from Bivens liability. However, this does not mean that a gov-
ernment contractor is judgment proof.2°7 On the contrary, the
Court left the liability door open for the government contractor by
indicating that a contractor could be liable in a common law tort
suit.208
With the increased privatization of government roles, the
availability of sovereign immunity to governmental contractors
200. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74.
201. See id. at 71.
202. Id. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I do not mean to imply that, if the narrowest ra-
tionale of Bivens did apply to a new context, I would extend its holding. I would not.").
203. See Jack M. Sabatino, Privatization and Punitives: Should Government Contrac-
tors Share the Sovereign's Immunities from Exemplary Damages? 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 175,
177 (1997) ("[I]t has become more commonplace for government agencies to 'privatize'
parts of their activities through contracts."); Mariana Claridad Pastore, Comment, Run-
ning From the Law: Federal Contractors Escape Bivens Liability, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
850, 850 (2002) ("[Tlhe private correctional industry has experienced dramatic growth.").
204. Sabatino, supra note 203, at 181-82.
205. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 63 n.1.
206. Id. at 63, 74.
207. Id. at 72-74 (recognizing the availability of a state tort remedy).
208. Id.
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(like CSC) and the proper scope of government contractor liability
has become a controversial issue. 219 Sovereign immunity provides
that an injured citizen cannot sue a government entity for an in-
jury arising out of that entity's completion of a federal task.2 10 The
Court has, at times, "derivatively extended [sovereign] immunity
to private parties acting as agents of the government."'21 This ex-
tension of sovereign immunity is illustrated in Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp .211 In Boyle, an independent contractor that
supplied a military helicopter with design defects to the United
States was deemed immune from liability."' The Court identified
this type of immunity as the government contractor defense. 214
The Court reasoned that in some instances "Iwhere the govern-
ment has directed a contractor to do the very thing that is the
subject of the claim ... a special circumstance [arises] where the
contractor may assert a defense."
1 5
The Malesko Court recognized the availability of the Boyle con-
tractor defense, but concluded that the record in Malesko "would
provide no basis for such a defense." 216 The Court's hesitation to
apply the contractor defense to CSC should raise red flags to the
government contractor because it represents a limited application
of a government contractor's immunity.217 Their immunity is de-
pendent on a particular fact scenario and on claims brought on a
209. See Sabatino, supra note 203, at 177, 186-90 (discussing the "heightened impor-
tance" of the accountability of government contractors).
210. See MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 225-
260 (7th ed. 2001).
211. Sabatino, supra note 203, at 177.
212. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
213. Id. at 503-04, 512.
214. Id. at 513. The Court stated that liability of independent contractors performing
work for the government is an area of uniquely federal concern, thereby requiring federal
law to trump state law in an adjudication of tort claims against contractors performing
work for the government. Id. at 512-13. The Court further held that when manufacturing
defects cannot be linked to government approval of specifications, applying the govern-
ment contractor defense to such defect claims would distort the purpose of the defense. See
id. at 510,
215. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 543 U.S. 61, 74 n.6 (2001) (citing Boyle, 487 U.S.
500 (1988)).
216. Id.
217. The government contractor defense has three elements: "(1) the United States ap-
proved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifica-
tions; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the
equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States." Boyle, 487 U.S.
at 512. Thus, the defense in Boyle is limited and likely would not apply to many govern-
ment contractors.
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particular legal theory (such as a Bivens cause of action).218 There-
fore, while the Malesko Court freed the government contractor
from liability under a Bivens cause of action, it made clear that a
government contractor does not have the blanket sovereign im-
munity enjoyed by government entities. 19
The inapplicability of Bivens liability to private corporations
clearly benefits the government contractor. 220 Nevertheless, the
Court's narrow reading of the contractor defense could invoke
hesitation on the part of the government contractor and detract
from the supply of willing contractors. 2 1 However, it is unlikely
that the contractor's exposure to the same kind of tort liability
that a private corporation faces daily would change the govern-
ment contractor's role dramatically. If the contractor's liability
was a concern, the contractor could simply look at the potential
costs of liability and the potential benefit of performing services
for the government. As with any business, if the potential costs
outweigh the potential benefits, then the contractor would have
the opportunity to refuse the government's business.223
V. CONCLUSION
The Court has been reining in the power of Bivens since Carl-
son, and Malesko marks its final resting place. The majority has
instituted an order to the Court that was lost in the "heady days"
of the Bivens epoch.22 4 Malesko cemented the idea that the Court
cannot overstep its judicial barriers in order to do what it thinks
is morally right.2 5 Instead, the Court is bound by the governmen-
218. The defendants are not liable if they fit within the acceptable fact scenario of the
contractor defense, detailed in Boyle, or are sued based on a Bivens cause of action, as is
evident from Malesko.
219. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74 (denying a Bivens action, but indicating that CSC
would not escape liability from a tort action).
220. See id.
221. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 ("The imposition of liability on Government contractors
will directly affect the terms of Government contracts: either the contractor will decline to
manufacture the design specified by the Government, or it will raise its price.").
222. Ronald A. Cass & Clayton P. Gillette, The Government Contractor Defense: Con-
tractual Allocation of Public Risk, 77 VA. L. REV. 257, 277 (1991) ("Presumably, [those af-
fected by tort rules] will only engage in an activity when the resulting personal benefit ex-
ceeds its expected personal costs, including liability costs.").
223. Id.; see also Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507.
224. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
225. But see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
20031
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tal structure that the founding fathers created.22 It is the judicial
branch's duty to interpret the law and the legislature's duty to
make the law.227 Therefore, until the legislature deems otherwise,
the Malesko majority and their respect for separation of powers
will continue to reign supreme over the desire to extend Bivens.
It is well established that § 1983228 provides a damages remedy
against state actors that parallels the relief available under a
Bivens cause of action.229 However, § 1983, unlike the Bivens rem-
edy, allows some governmental liability.2 3 The availability of gov-
ernmental liability under § 1983 and the lack thereof under
Bivens could be interpreted as a need for congressional action.
Since the present Supreme Court denounced the judicial legisla-
tion that led to the implied damage remedy under Bivens,231 per-
haps it is time for Congress to legislate a consistent remedy in the
federal and state systems that has been lacking.232 This would
likely alleviate the majority's claims of judicial activism 2 3 and the
dissent's allegations of insufficient remedies for constitutional
violations. 234
Matthew G. Mazefsky
U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (determining that it is more important to provide constitutional vic-
tims with the maximum amount of compensation rather than to uphold the separation of
powers doctrine).
226. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
227. See supra text accompanying note 48.
228. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). This provision makes anyone acting under color of state
law liable to an injured party if they deprive that party "of any rights.., secured by the
Constitution and laws." Id.
229. Pastore, supra note 203, at 874-75.
230. Conelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Offi-
cials'Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 74 (1999).
231. See supra Par IV.C.
232. Pastore, supra note 203, at 875 ("[S]urely [the Court] can determine whether a
federal contractor is liable to suit under Bivens, as they have specifically addressed that
issue in reference to § 1983.").
233. See supra Part IV.C.
234. See supra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
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